Re: The role of the divine

[Gary Kern <gkern@alumni.Princeton.EDU>]

GK:

> > 1. I did not say anything about "all of Jünger's views," only this one,
> > namely, that a person's life is complete no matter when he dies and no
> > one dies before his work is done.
> 
>         I guess what I want to say is that it does not sound as bad as you
> depict it. It is Jünger seeking a deeper meaning that came from his
> reflections on life & Death. I can see an intrinsic truth in it. It is
> saying rather that all
> Human life is valuable and that mass murder cannot be politicized and
> justified because every life has meaning. Isn't it the materialistic
> belief that a human is just resource to be used and thrown away?
> 
> > 2. In opposing that view I do not assert a materialist position at all.
> > Quite the contrary, I assert the value of human life against the
> > implacable hand of fate--or the will of God.

Abdalbarr: 
>         The "humanistic" point of view is materialism of the highest calibre,
> coming from the enlightenment as it does. Its basis is reason and
> certaily not faith. Finding its roots in the french revolution.
> 
> To quote EJ, Strahlungen II 18.Aug.1944:
> 
>         "Die Zerstorung der Alten Welt, wie sie mit der Franzoesischen
> Revolution & eigentlich schon mit der Renaissance cichtbar zu werden
> beginnt, gleicht dem Absterben der organischen Verbindungen, der Nerven
> und Arterien. Wenn der Prozeß beendet ist, treten die Gewaltmenshcen
> auf..."
> 
>         If God created us then we belong to him. We can not claim divinity nor
> can we rage against fate, the danger here lies in hubris, claiming the
> rank of the divine and passing judgement against it, although we are
> only mortals suffering from limited vision.
>         Fate is rather something we must live with and  in 'the moment' it
> certainly does not exist. Every moment must be uncovered for itself.
>         The Greeks did not have the same idea of tragedy that we have today.
> Today, something is tragic because the victims were taken in thier
> prime. It is simply a loss without meaning. Thus it is synonimus with
> the terrible and bad. Classical tragedy was something else though, it
> had meaning because its source was divine. The tragic was for them the
> means by which man is propelled to greater wisdom and understanding of
> himself. If we cannot escape fate we must be content to live with it, to
> accept it, and surpass it.
>         It seems to me that we have value because our ability to recognize
> fate, unlike animals.

GK:
 
> > 3. EJ's position, I think, is meant to be paradoxical.  It charms us by
> > overturning the normal reaction to things.  Generally I like to do the
> > that, but here the consequences are too great:  total acceptance of the
> > "will of God," which "allots" you your time.

Abdalbarr:
 
> Yes, but then what role does the divine play? Are we created? Is there a
> course of events? Are we here and is God up there? usw. My point here,
> either one accepts the divine and fate or one rages against it. The
> second is useless because in the end, we have no control over our fate,
> we cannot strike out against fate. The only control we have is that we
> take life into our own hands i.e. suicide. Which Thomas already gave a
> commentary on.

GK:
 
> > 4. Now what is that "will of God"?  The answer is anything that happens.
> > You cross the street and live 30 more years, completing your life's work
> > and dying in retirement.  Or you cross the street and are catapulted 350
> > feet against a stone wall, so that your survivors have to conceptualize
> > you as a completed life.  Both, to those people left behind, is the will
> > of God.  Or:  you have a serious disease, and those who accept the will
> > of God are prepared to go either way--if you survive, God helped you; if
> > you die, God took you to heaven.  In short, EJ asserts that no matter
> > what happens to you, it is good.


Abdalbarr:
 
> This point is clear. You take the pessimistic point of view or the view
> of
> Schopenhauer. Maybe EJ is taking the optimistic point view or the view
> of
> Leibniz? "The best of all possible worlds..."


GK:
 
> > 5. It is possible to reject this position and still to admire EJ.  Even
> > when wrong he is original and stimulating.  He is a teacher, but not to
> > be followed in all things.  On this point we can follow his iconoclastic
> > spirit, not his specific solution to the tragedy of premature death.

Abdalbarr:
 
> It is my view that EJ as a poet is striking out for a deeper
> understanding
> of the world we contend with every day. I would also posit that
> everything
> has its meaning and in its relation to the whole is good. Would this
> imply
> the return of the divine?

GK:
 
> > My position is this:  Sometimes what happens to you is good, sometimes
> > it is bad.  When it is bad, it is wrong.  The world is so arranged that
> > you must play a losing game.  So the set-up is wrong.  Man opposes the
> > will of God.

Abdalbarr:
 
> I guess the major question here is what is the role of the Divine? And
> if everything is so bad to begin with why would we want the divine to
> return, meaning "only a god can save us now..." Martin Heidegger, to Der
> Spiegel.
> What is then the definition of Nihilism and its relation to EJ, the loss
> of the divine and it's return?
> 
> Just a few thoughts in response. 
**********************************************
Greek tragedy is about hubris, no doubt, but also about man's struggle
with the gods (Prometheus).  Man was ripping himself away from primitive
superstitions, stealing the fire and word for himself.  Meanwhile, in
the Levant, he was discovering the gross injustice and pettiness of his
almighty god (Job).  The struggle since then has taken various forms,
including the humanist-materialist.  But all those who question and
seek, as for example Dostoyevsky, cannot be placed in this category.

As I see it, most discussion about God is an attempt to reconcile the
incompatibility of a given concept of Him with human experience.  For
example, concept one:  God is good.  But bad things happen.  So then,
God has a greater good, which we cannot divine.  Or concept two:  God is
omnipotent.  But his son on earth was crucified.  Well then, he gave his
son as a sacrifice to wash away our sins etc.  Or concept three:  God is
all merciful.  But little children die in screaming agony, they die with
matchstick legs and bloated stomachs, they die after they are beaten and
raped.  Ah then, these are the works of man, and God allows man freedom
of will so that his choice for the good may be free.  And so on.  It's
all apologetics for incompatible and historically inadequate concepts
that must periodically be revised.  I hate to sound like Feuerbach, but
man is wrestling with his own discordant concepts of God, striving to
conceptualize the divine in a way that makes sense.  Nietzsche, it seems
to me, never quite understood this, and continued to wrestle with God
inside concepts that infuriated him, thereby giving God an external
validity, which infuriated him all the more.

My view is this:  God needs us.  The old God, like the demiurge of the
Gnostics, has become the Evil God who has just presented us with a
century of horrors.  We won't get anywhere if we bow our heads and say
that it's all "God's will" and everyone dies at the right moment, when
his life is complete.  The way to go is to understand that God evolves
like everything else and needs a new transformation.

Man is the means whereby the world manifests itself, as Sartre said. 
Man is also the means whereby the world gets criticized, as I say.  What
is, is wrong.  God's set-up stinks.  That means that there is some other
force, acting through us, that will give rise to a new conception.

EJ's conception--on this particular point--is archaic, atavistic and
wrong, however imaginatively and paradoxically stated.  It also seems to
me to be at odds with the more mystical approach taken in ALADDIN'S
PROBLEM.

GK